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Abstract: Phase change memory (PCM) technology appears as more scalable than DRAM technology. As PCM
exhibits access time slightly longer but in the same range as DRAMs, several recent studies have proposed to
use PCMs for designing main memory systems. Unfortunately PCM technology suffers from a limited write
endurance; typically each memory cell can be only be written a large but still limited number of times (107 to 109
writes are reported for current technology). Till now, research proposals have essentially focused their attention
on designing memory systems that will survive to the average behavior of conventional applications. However
PCM memory systems should be designed to survive worst-case applications, i.e., malicious attacks targeting the
physical destruction of the memory through overwriting a limited number of memory cells.
In this paper, we propose the design of a secure PCM-based main memory that would by construction survive
to overwrite attacks. In order to prevent a malicious user to overwrite some memory cells, the physical memory
address (PA) manipulated by the computer system is not the same as the PCM memory address (PCMA). PCMA is
made invisible from the rest of the computer system. The PCM memory controller is in charge of the PA-to-PCMA
translation . Hiding PCMA alone does not prevent a malicious user to overwrite a PCM memory word. Therefore
in the secure PCM-based main memory, PA-to-PCMA translation is continuously modified through a random
process, such preventing a malicious user to overwrite some PCM memory words. PCM address invisibility
and continuous random PA-to-PCMA translation ensures security against an overwrite attack as well it ensures a
practical write endurance close to the theoretical maximum. The hardware overhead needed to ensure this security
in the PCM controller includes a random number generator and a medium large address translation table.
Key-words: Emerging memory technology, security
Towards Phase Change Memory as a Secure Main Memory
Re´sume´ : Phase Change Memory est une technologie me´moire e´mergente qui apparait comme un concurrent
potentiel de la technologie DRAM.
Dans ce rapport, nous pre´sentons le design d’une me´moire principale utilisant ce type de technologie et
re´sistant aux attaques par sur-e´criture.
Mots-cle´s : Nouvelle technologie mmoire, se´curite´
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Abstract
Phase change memory (PCM) technology appears as more scalable than DRAM technology. As PCM exhibits
access time slightly longer but in the same range as DRAMs, several recent studies have proposed to use PCMs for
designing main memory systems. Unfortunately PCM technology suffers from a limited write endurance; typically
each memory cell can be only be written a large but still limited number of times (107 to 109 writes are reported
for current technology). Till now, research proposals have essentially focused their attention on designing memory
systems that will survive to the average behavior of conventional applications. However PCM memory systems
should be designed to survive worst-case applications, i.e., malicious attacks targeting the physical destruction of
the memory through overwriting a limited number of memory cells.
In this paper, we propose the design of a secure PCM-based main memory that would by construction survive
to overwrite attacks. In order to prevent a malicious user to overwrite some memory cells, the physical memory
address (PA) manipulated by the computer system is not the same as the PCM memory address (PCMA). PCMA is
made invisible from the rest of the computer system. The PCM memory controller is in charge of the PA-to-PCMA
translation . Hiding PCMA alone does not prevent a malicious user to overwrite a PCM memory word. Therefore
in the secure PCM-based main memory, PA-to-PCMA translation is continuously modified through a random
process, such preventing a malicious user to overwrite some PCM memory words. PCM address invisibility and
continuous random PA-to-PCMA translation ensures security against an overwriting attack as well it ensures a
practical write endurance close to the theoretical maximum. The hardware overhead needed to ensure this security
in the PCM controller includes a random number generator and a medium large address translation table.
1 Introduction
Phase change memory (PCM) technology [4] appears as a promising technology for designing main memory in
future computer systems [1, 5, 3, 2]. PCM presents advantages over DRAMs in terms of static energy consumption
as well as integration scalability for future technologies generations; for instance, [3] anticipates a 4X higher
memory density with PCM than with DRAM. Since PCM presents read access time in the same range as DRAMs,
PCM has been recently considered as an alternative for designing main memory systems [1, 5, 3, 2]. Unfortunately,
PCM suffers from a limited write endurance, i.e., a PCM memory cell can only support a limited number of writes
and exceeding this limit might impair its correct functioning. The reported write endurances for PCM memory
vary between 107 and 109 writes on a single cell. Such a limited endurance has been recognized as a major issue
for the design of PCM-based main memory systems. Several propositions [1, 5, 3, 2] have been made to allow a
PCM main memory to survive the anticipated lifetime of a computer system, i.e., 10 to 20 years, in the context of
general applications.
The security hole of PCM based main memory At the exception of [2], these studies completely ignore the
security breach that the limited write endurance of PCM components would create in a main memory. Using PCM
components for main memory would create an opportunity to a malicious attacker to physically destroy the main
memory through a very simple program overwriting the same memory cells again and again. The potential attack
is particularly simple to mount. It can be run by any user without any execution privilege.
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Qureshi et [2] mention that their Region Based Start Gap scheme would survive to such a naive overwrite
attack consisting in constantly overwriting the same physical memory address. However in Section 2, we will
explain why the RBSG scheme is not secure.
If this overwrite security breach is not closed then no reasonable computer manufacturer will ever consider
PCM for implementing main memory.
Contribution In this paper, we propose the design of a secure main PCM memory that will not suffer from this
security breach. In order to prevent a malicious user to overwrite some memory cells, the physical memory address
(PA) manipulated by the computer system is not the same as the PCM memory address (PCMA) as proposed in
[2]. PCMA is made invisible from the rest of the computer system. The PCM memory controller is in charge of
the PA-to-PCMA translation . Hiding PCMA alone does not prevent a malicious user to blindly overwrite some
PCM memory blocks. Therefore in the secure PCM-based main memory, PA-to-PCMA translation is continuously
modified through a random process. This prevents a malicious user to overwrite some PCM memory words, it
also uniformizes the write pressure on the overall memory for every possible type of workloads. For implementing
the PA-to-PCMA translation, the PCM memory controller implements a translation table and needs an efficient
random number generator. Our study shows that for PCM memory components with write endurance in the
108−109 range, associating a single translation table entry with a 4K memory blocks region should be sufficient
to ensure that the resulting PCM memory would reach 74-83 % of the expected total memory write endurance
if writes were uniformly distributed on the main memory while generating an extra 12.5 % writes on the PCM
memory.
2 Deconstructing the security of Region Based Start-Gap scheme [2]
2.1 The start-gap scheme
The start-gap scheme proposed in [2] considers dynamic PA-to-PCMA translation that varies during the lifetime
of the computer. PA is translated at run-time in PCMA through a logic function and this function is periodically
slightly modified every N memory block writes on the PCM memory . In [2], N=100 is considered. Thus the PA-
to-PCMA translation does not remain constant; at each parameter change, PA-to-PCMA translation is conserved
for every physical memory block, apart one.
The start-gap scheme tends to smooth the distribution of writes on the PCM memory. However, for appli-
cations presenting spatial locality on memory writes, the initial start-gap scheme does not smoothly equalize the
write charge on the PCM memory. Qureshi et al. [2] augments their initial start-gap scheme with a pseudo-
randomization of the PA-to-PCMA translation. A Fleistel network function is first applied on PA and is followed
by the start-gap mechanism. This overall scheme is shown to smoothly average the write pressure on the overall
memory for a significant set of benchmarks, since it eliminates spatial locality on PCM memory writes.
Pointing out the security hole associated with malicious overwrite attacks, Qureshi et al. [2] improve their
scheme with applying start-gap to memory regions instead of the whole memory. The size R (measured in memory
blocks of the region is determined in order to ensure that the PCM address of a physical memory block will be
modified before Wmax writes on the region; Wmax being the write endurance of the PCM components. That is
R < Wmax100 . If the parameters of the Fleistel network function are unknown from the attacker (e.g. personalized
for each machine at manufacturing time without any external access to read them) then this region-based stat-gap
scheme (RBSG) should allow the PCM main memory to survive several months to a malicious attack consisting
in constantly overwriting the same physical memory address.
The write traffic overhead of the start-gap scheme is very limited: one extra PCM memory block write per 100
physical writes.
2.2 Deconstructing the region based start-gap scheme security
2.2.1 Birthday paradox attack
Unfortunately, the RBSG scheme would not survive a slightly more malicious attack using the birthday paradox.
If one picks random elements in a set of X elements then sequences with far less than X elements are very likely to
exhibit pairs of equal elements: in a group of 24 persons, there is in average at least one pair of persons having the
same birthday. For a set of 256K elements (resp. 64M), picking in average 645 (resp. 7230) random elements is
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sufficient to exhibit a pair of equal samples sequence are required for 218 (resp. 226 ) elements. Through leveraging
this property, an attacker could significantly reduce the time needed to overwrite some memory block in the PCM
memory.
A ”birthday paradox” attack on a PCM memory would consist simply in overwriting the same physical block
Wmax times, then randomly picking another physical memory etc. To counteract the delayed write policy suggested
in [2], one has simply to interleave 16 write flows.
Our estimation for the example illustrating [2] is that, assuming a 4 GBbytes/s write bandwidth, 4 hours in
average would be sufficient for a ”birthday paradox attack” for overwriting some block in the considered 16GB
PCM main memory, while the theoretical write endurance of the overall memory should be 4 years. The attack
could be implemented at user level without sophisticated knowledge of the intrinsics of the memory structure
and/or flaws in the operating system.
2.2.2 Sandbagging RBSG is unpractical
One could try to improve the endurance of the RBSG scheme to birthday paradox attacks through decreasing
the size of the regions in RBSG. Thus the size of the region could be decreased in order that the PA-to-PCMA
translation of a block is guaranteed to be modified after at most WmaxI writes on the region. If the region features R
blocks then one should enforce R< Wmax100I
For I in the range of 8-16, this would make the ”birthday paradox” attack unpractical, but would bring back
practicality to brute force attacks consisting in overwriting always the same physical memory: using I=8 in the
example illustrating [2] reduces the endurance interval of the PCM memory from 4 months to 2 weeks.
Moreover, if PCM components are used as main memory, a page mode as on DRAM would be needed order
to fully exploit memory spatial locality on memory reads. To implement such a page mode, (for instance 4 Kbytes
page ), the overall page should move at the same time, leading the write overhead of the RBSG scheme to the
read and write of one page every N writes. To maintain a reasonable write bandwidth overhead, N should be in
the order of 1000 instead of 100. This would further reduce the number of location for a block in a region: if the
region features P pages then one should guarantee P< Wmax1000I .
Using I=8 in the example illustrating [2] reduces the endurance interval of the PCM memory to an overwrite
attack is further reduced by a factor 10, i.e., to one and a half day.
2.3 Analysis of RBSG weaknesses
To resist to an overwrite attack, the PA-to-PCMA translation must be modified dynamically at execution time.
The first weakness of the RBSG scheme as described in [2] is associated with a faulty evaluation of this
constraint; the authors assumed that dimensioning regions in order that the PA-to-PCMA translation of any phys-
ical block is modified before the write endurance of the associated PCM block is reached would be sufficient.
Unfortunately the birthday paradox provides an opportunity of an efficient attack.
The second and more fundamental weakness of the RBSG scheme lies in the definition of the region-based
start-gap scheme by itself. The PCM memory is statically divided in regions and the PA-to-PCMA translation
local scheme is periodic. The attacker is guaranteed that the naive overwrite of the same physical memory block
will result in writing always on the same region in the memory: the endurance of the whole PCM memory to a
naive attack is limited to the endurance of a single region. The need to resist to the birthday paradox attack as well
as the need for a page mode to ensure high read bandwidth reduce the practical number of PCM blocks on which
a physical block can be mapped. Thus the practical endurance to overwrite attack of the whole PCM memory is
only a small fraction of the overall theoretical endurance of the PCM memory.
3 A secure PCM-based main memory
3.1 Security principles
3.1.1 Invisible PA-to-PCMA translation is required
If a malicious attacker knows the PA-to-PCMA translation, then for a given PCM memory block B, he/she is able
to figure out the address of the physical memory block that is mapped on B. If the PA-to-PCMA translation is
made invisible from the outside of the PCM memory then the attacker can not retrieve the address of the physical
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memory block mapped on a given memory block. Figure 1 illustrates this invisibility: the computer system
manipulates data in the physical address space, but has no access to the PCM address.
Memory Controller:
PA-to-PCMA translation
PCM
bank
PCM
bank
PCM
bank
PCM
bank
PCM address space
Physical address space
Figure 1: Physical memory address space and PCM memory address space
3.1.2 PA-to-PCMA translations must dynamically change
Our analysis of the RBSG scheme has shown that, in order to resist a birthday paradox attack, the PA-to-PCMA
translation of any physical block B has to be modified with a frequency largely higher than one time every W max
possible writes on B.
The PA-to-PCMA translation changes should be completely unpredictable from the outside of the PCM mem-
ory; in particular there should be no restrictions on the new translation. Through limiting the translation change
possibility to a single region, the RBSG scheme is providing an overwrite attack possibility.
3.2 Principles of a practical secure PCM-based main memory
3.2.1 PA-to-PCMA translation
In the secure PCM-based main memory we propose, the PA-to-PCMA translation is performed by the PCM-
memory controller through the use of a translation table. For a physical memory block B, the address of the
corresponding PCM block is computed from an entry read in the translation table and the address B. The PA-to-
PCMA translation must perform a one-to-one address translation from the physical address space to PCM address
space.
The simplest mapping would be to associate a translation table entry with each physical memory block and en-
suring that the translation is a one-to-one block mapping. Such one-to-one block mapping appears as unpractical:
for instance 256M entries would be needed to map a 16 GBytes memory using 64 bytes memory blocks, leading
to an indirect translation table requiring approximately a gigabyte of storage in the PCM memory controller to
implement the translation table. Instead, we associate a single translation table entry with a region of R contigu-
ous memory blocks; for instance if 4K contiguous memory blocks are mapped by a single entry, 64K entries are
sufficient to map 16 GBytes.
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PA-to-PCMA region address translation Initializing at boot time the translation table T with a one-to-one
region mapping is unpractical. Instead of such an initialization, we assume that at initialization time, the translation
table T is initialized with only zeros, but that some computation is performed at run-time in addition to the read
of the translation table. If memory regions are numbered from 0 to N-1, the translation is performed as follows:
region B in physical memory is mapped onto region (T(B).address xor B xor R init), where R init is a random
number generated at initialization time.
PA-to-PCMA region displacement translation The use of a single entry to map a complete region of the
physical memory could lead to a possible overwrite attack on trying to write a specific block in all the regions, for
instance the first block. In order to avoid such an attack, the displacement in the region is also translated. Physical
memory block X in region B is mapped onto block ( T(B).disp xor X xor D init ) in region (T(B).address xor B
xor D init). As R init, D init is a random number generated at initialization time. This PA-to-PCMA translation
is illustrated on Figure 2.
T(B).addr ⊕ B ⊕R_init T(B).disp ⊕X ⊕ D_init 
B                 
region displacement
X
address disp
PCM address space 
Physical memory address space 
Figure 2: PA-to-PCMA translation
More complex translation functions replacing D init and R init by functions randomly parameterized at ini-
tialization time can be considered.
3.2.2 Dynamically changing PA-to-PCMA translation
In order to avoid blind overwrite attacks, the PA-to-PCMA translation must be continuously modified. More pre-
cisely, only writes represent an issue. Therefore, the PA-to-PCMA translation modification is triggered randomly
and only on memory writes.
This random triggering is particularly important: As an example, if the PA-to-PCMA translation change oc-
curs periodically on writes, for instance every 10 writes, an attacker could repeat the sequence of nine consecutive
writes on physical block B, one write on physical block C. Physical block C moves in the PCM memory, but block
B remains on the same PCM memory location that can be easily overwritten.
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How to modify PA-to-PCMA translation Modifying the PA-to-PCMA translation for a physical region B is
implementing through swapping the translations for two physical regions. This guarantees that the PA-to-PCMA
translation remains a one-to-one mapping. The region swapping induces the modification of two entries in the
translation table as described below.
A random physical region B’ is chosen and the PA-to-PCMA translations of B and B’ are exchanged, i.e.,
T(B).address := old(T(B’).address) xor B’ xor B and T(B’).address := old(T(B).address) xor B’ xor B. At the
same time, displacement translations inside blocks B and B’ are also modified,: T(B).disp: =old(T(B)).disp xor
RAND and T(B’).disp: =old(T(B’)).disp xor RAND where RAND is randomly selected 1.
The two memory regions in the PCM memory have to read and swapped accordingly.
Frequency of PA-to-PCMA translation modifications The cost of a PA-to-PCMA translation modification is
proportional to the size R of a region in the memory. The two swapped regions have to be read and rewritten, i.e.,
a PA-to-PCMA translation modification induces 2 R memory block reads and 2 R memory block writes.
Therefore, the frequency of the address translation modification should be chosen in order to maintain the total
overhead to a reasonable level. In this study, we arbitrarily estimate that inducing in average one extra write on
the PCM memory per 8 effective writes would be acceptable. That is, in average one out of 16 R physical memory
block writes can trigger a PA-to-PCMA address translation modification. Therefore on receiving a write on a
physical memory block, the modification of its PA-to-PCMA translation is randomly triggered with probability
1
16R .
3.3 Putting all together in the memory controller
The design of a secure PCM-based main memory lead to several constraints inside the memory controller.
3.3.1 Write endurance and region size
The principles above in Section 3.2 lead to the design of a PCM-based main memory on which an overwrite attack
would only be able to consecutively write the same memory block in average 16R times before the physical block
is moved in another PCM memory block. In practice, a write attack could succeed in significantly reducing the
lifetime of the memory, if 16R is not small with respect to the write endurance of the cells.
We run simulations of an overwrite attack on a 16 GBytes PCM memory i.e., 228 64-byte blocks. Regions
of respectively 64K, 4K and 256 memory blocks were considered. If the memory features a write endurance of
Wmax = 2E writes, then the theoretical write endurance of a uniformly accessed PCM memory is 228+E .
With a write endurance of only 8 Megawrites (223) per cell, using 64K memory blocks per region is not an
option: some memory blocks would be destroyed by a brute force overwrite attack in less than a billion (230)
writes. With 4K memory blocks regions, the PCM memory would be able to support an attack consisting of up to
38 % of the theoretical 251 writes. With 256 memory block regions, this ratio would increase up to 71 %.
If the write endurance is 128 Megawrites per cell (227) then these respective ratios become 38 % for 64K
memory blocks regions, 74 % for 4K memory blocks region and 85 % for 256 memory blocks region for a
theoretical maximum of 88.88 % since in average one extra block write is triggered for 8 physical memory writes.
If the write endurance is 1 Gigawrites per cell (230) then these ratios become 65 % , 83 % and 86% for 64K,
4K and 256 memory block regions respectively.
Therefore, if the technology is able to ensure write endurance in the billion range then even very large regions
could be considered for PA-to-PCM translations.
3.3.2 Memory controller constraints
The secure PCM main memory would need to integrate extra hardware in the memory controller to implement the
secure PA-to-PCMA translation.
Memory storage volume The storage volume of the PCM memory controller is a major issue. The main
component is the translation table that features an entry per memory region. For a 16 GB memory, the use of
regions of 256 64-bytes blocks would lead to 1 M entries, each entry featuring the address of region (20 bits) and
a displacement in the region (8 bits) i.e. a total of 28 bits. The total storage cost of the translation table would be
1The same RAND is used since it allows to exchange the blocks one per one among the B and B’ regions.
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3.5 Megabytes. Using larger granularity regions for instance 4K 64-byte blocks would lead to a much smaller 224
Kbytes translation table.
For a 256 GB memory, using 4K 64-bytes blocks regions would still appear possible since it would lead to a 4
Megabytes translation table. For such a 256 GB memory and 64K 64-byte blocks regions would only necessitate
256 Kbytes for the translation table.
Swapping memory regions logic The memory controller has to handle the important function of swapping two
memory regions on a PA-to-PCMA translation change. This induces a large number of memory reads and writes.
An atomic swap of the two memory regions would stop the normal read and write accesses by the computer system
. This would not unacceptable.
Therefore the memory controller must feature logic to interleave blocks swapping with the normal flow of
reads and writes from the computer system. The logic must be able to handle the case where a normal write is
overwriting a block belonging to one of the memory regions being swapped. Moreover this normal flow of writes
may randomly trigger new region swaps; the memory controller should be able to buffer these swaps.
The priority on writes must be dynamically adapted in order to maintain a limited number of regions waiting
for swaps, for example at most 8 swaps. As an example, we tested a policy randomly splitting the write priority
to 1/4th for region swapping and 3/4th for normal write flow when less than 4 region swaps are waiting and one
half for region swapping and one half for normal write flow when 4 or more region swaps. On an experiment on
240 writes and assuming a continuous saturated write flow from the computer system, there was never more then
8 waiting region swaps.
Extra PA-to-PCMA translation latency The extra access time to main memory due to PA-to-PCMA translation
is essentially due to the read of the PA-to-PCMA translation table. This table will be implemented as a SRAM
table in the memory controller. For a 16 GB memory using 4K 64-byte blocks region, the read access time of a
224Kbytes SRAM memory would in the range of 3-5 processor cycles and would be marginal compared with the
overall main memory access time.
The random number generator Our secure PCM-based main memory will be able to resist to an overwrite
attack if no one is able to follow or reconstruct the PA-to-PCMA translation process. Our proposal heavily relies
on a random number generator. The security of our proposal also depends of the security of this random number
generator.
One can remark that the output of the random number generation used in our memory controller cannot be di-
rectly observed from the outside of the PCM memory. Therefore different possible schemes could be implemented
ranging from a true hardware random generator to a simpler algorithmic pseudo-random number generator per-
sonalized with a huge key at manufacturing time.
3.4 A secure PCM main memory might become practical in a few years
A need for large write endurance per cell A rule of thumb that has been approximately respected for the past
10 years has been that in general purpose computer systems, the processor was able to write its complete main
memory in a second. That is if a system features X GBytes, its achievable memory write bandwidth is in the X
GBytes/s range.
This rule of thumb is very useful to determine at which write endurance threshold, the PCM technology will
become reliable enough to consider using it as main memory for computer systems. As Qureshi et al [2], we
approximate a year by 225 seconds. Therefore, a memory system randomly and uniformly exercised at full write
bandwidth will necessitate a endurance per cell of 225 writes per cell and per year of expected life of the system.
That is a write endurance per cell of 256 Megawrites for 8 years and 1 Gigawrites for 32 years.
Economic feasibility of PCM main memory If within a few years, the write endurance per cell on PCM
components reach a billion writes then it would become feasible to build 16 GBytes (or larger) memory using
comparatively very small PA-to-PCMA translation table (for instance, using 64K memory regions): as mentioned
above, the secure PCM memory would be able to survive to an overwrite attack at full write bandwidth for 65 %
of an expected lifetime of 32 years.
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Page mode is compatible with security If PCM memories are used as main memory then a page mode would
be interesting as on current DRAM to limit the access latency and increase bandwidth when the memory read
requests exhibit high spatial locality. Our PA-to-PCMA translation scheme is compatible with such page mode
since regions are large enough to accommodate large page, even split across several PCM components.
4 Conclusion
If the promises of the PCM technology are fulfilled (4X higher integration density, 1 billion write endurance per
cell, access time in the same range as DRAMs, dynamic energy consumption in the same range as DRAMs) then it
will become economically feasible to build a main memory from PCM memory component in the next few years.
Such a PCM-based main memory will particularly be attractive due to its very low static energy consumption.
However to consider such a memory for an industry product , the PCM based memory would have to be able to
resist to software overwrite attacks targeting its physical destruction.
In this paper, we have proposed a first secure PCM based main memory that will resist to overwrite attacks . By
hiding the effective PCM memory address from the rest of the computer system and continuously and randomly
moving the physical memory blocks in PCM memory, overwrite attacks are made impossible. The proposed PA-
to-PCMA translation scheme uniformizes and randomizes the write flow on PCM memory for malicious overwrite
attacks as well as conventional non malicious applications. Our scheme requires some hardware overhead in the
memory controller (essentially a PA-to-PCMA translation table, the memory region swapping logic and a random
number generator). But it brings the practical write endurance of the overall PCM main memory in 70-85 % of
the theoretical write endurance of a uniformly accessed PCM memory.
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